Pilot flew 13 years on fake license

[AN]

http://thenews.jang.com.pk/updates.asp?id=99938


DUTCH officials have arrested a Swedish pilot who flew for commercial airlines for 13 years using a fake licence.

The 41-year-old pilot, who lives in Milan, clocked up at least 10,000 hours flying for airlines based in Britain, Italy and Belgium.

Following a tip-off from the Swedish authorities, officials detained him at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport yesterday as he was preparing to take off for Ankara in a Boeing 737 with 101 passengers on board, Dutch police said.

The pilot had previously held a licence to fly small planes, but it had expired and did not allow him to fly large airliners.

He has been held in custody and a judge in Haarlem, near Amsterdam, will decide on Saturday if he should be released on bail while awaiting trial for forging documents and flying without a licence.




Where are all the PIA bashing people now?

[Huraiz]

Where are all the PIA bashing people now?

Lol,there is thread on A.net about this pilot,read that and tell us how many posters are bending backwards to defend him.

[innovative]

@AN, Very Good Find!

Basically this PIA bashing is a disease that stems from Pakistan bashing. Keyword is not Pakistan International Airlines, its the *Pakistan* in PIA that causes the problem.

[bernyjee]

Who has bashed PIA for allowing fake pilots to fly its aircraft? I don't remember any such thing on this forum.

[uetflyer]

The pilot did not have a license, and was caught. He is undergoing the full process of the law in a transparent manner, as he deserves.

What has this got to do with PIA? No one has accused their pilots of being unqualified.

[Huraiz]

@AN, Very Good Find!

Basically this PIA bashing is a disease that stems from Pakistan bashing. Keyword is not Pakistan International Airlines, its the *Pakistan* in PIA that causes the problem.

No you are wrong,problem is victimised mentality which prevails in Pakistan,and PIA is not immune of it.

[boomtha]

A shoemaker has become chairman PIA.So what to say about it?

[bernyjee]

I'll not defend the shoemaker since he did not improve much. Though, as a business man, he envisoned great future for PIA in North America rightly or wrongly.

But a pilot running the show, and not improving any thing, speaks for itself. Again I don't want to be negative.

Running the airline is a difficult and complex job and one needs to have multi-dimensional experience and skills. Just putting a shoe maker, a marketer, a pilot or an Air Marshal cannot and will not bring good results. People like Noor Khan and Mr. Rafeeq Saigol were exceptional individuals with sharp administrative skills and strong business vision with honesty at their palms.

Govt should promote professionals from within PIA.

[uetflyer]

Why is this thread here? It should be in "World Avaition Forum". Maybe Abbas is sleeping...

[AN]

Shoemaker seems overqualified............considering the qualifications of the top man
heh

[rayyanullah]

For the information of readers I remember a friend telling me that in the late seventies there was a guy who joined PIA as captain on 707/720 and was fired as he could not make the final check although he completed all training from left seat. Later it was learnt that he did not have a valid pilot licence and was an Indian national too. The old timers may remember this.

[Tayub]

As long as I could remember; PIA never hired anyone directly to B-707/B-720. Let alone hiring someone for the left seat. Even the Ex-Pakistan Air Force pilots had to start from the bottom in PIA. I believe, currently PIA has the same practice in hiring and training pilots.

[Abbas Ali]

For the information of readers I remember a friend telling me that in the late seventies there was a guy who joined PIA as captain on 707/720 and was fired as he could not make the final check although he completed all training from left seat. Later it was learnt that he did not have a valid pilot licence and was an Indian national too. The old timers may remember this.

It happened in early part of 1980 and is mentioned in chapter 23 of book titled 'Come Fly With Me - Jets' authored by Capt. Johnny Sadiq. The pilot with fake licence was Richard Khan who presented himself as 'Capt. Richard Khan' and he had dual nationality i.e. British and Indian.

PIA in late 1979 had invited applications from foreign pilots. Pilots holding Swedish, German, Dutch, Belgian or British Airlines Transport Pilot's Licence (ALTP) were invited to apply to join PIA as Boeing 707/720B Captain. Here's advertisement which appeared in 'Flight International' magazine in December 1979.


Source: Flight Archives

Richard Khan failed PIA flight checks/tests, details are given in Capt. Johnny’s book. Later PIA Chief Pilot Training sent copy of Richard Khan’s licence to USA for verification and it was proved as a fake licence. According to Capt. Johnny Sadiq's book, it was found out that Richard Khan's father was a pilot and senior instructor in Air India. With his father's help, Richard Khan had spent many hours on Boeing 707 simulator and learnt to fly the aircraft.

Richard Khan's father also had managed to acquire a Boeing 707-321, used a fake Zaire registration mark for the aircraft and used various company names to use the aircraft for cargo flights mainly between India and Gulf States. The Boeing 707 was poorly maintained and on one occasion it was also damaged due to poor flying skills of Richard Khan.

In later part of 1980, due to poor maintenance the Boeing 707 flown by Richard Khan and his father had to make en emergency landing in Ankara where the aircraft was confiscated by Turkish Authorities. Interestingly the Boeing 707 flown by Richard Khan and his father in 1980 was former Pan American Boeing 707-321 (N723PA) which was acquired on lease by PIA from February 9, 1960 to December 12, 1962 and had made PIA the first Asian airline to operate jets.

Following is an interesting article with details how Richard Khan and his father managed to acquire the Boeing 707 and flew it under fake registration. The article appeared in 'Flight International' December 27, 1980 issue.

The Bristol Cowboy

By DAVID LEARMOUNT

AIRCRAFT have a glamour which prevents people thinking of them as they do cars. But both are commodities which start life with shiny paint and progress through the hands of many more or less reputable owners before finishing on the scrap heap. Aviation, for all its shiny image, has its share of questionable businesses. With this story of a particular aeroplane's dotage and eventual demise we remind our readers that these businesses exist, and leave them to draw their own conclusions about the effectiveness of current international controls.

On October 11 last year a Boeing 707-321 displaying false Zaire registration took off from Bristol Lulsgate for Kuwait. The 6,600ft runway proved insufficient to allow the aeroplane to become airborne, although under the prevailing conditions a 707 in good shape should not have required the extra ground trampled by this one. The aircraft extensively damaged approach lighting, carried a quantity of hedge and tree with it to Kuwait, and left behind at Lulsgate large, sections of both inner flaps. Fuel load was about 155,0001b, but the fuselage was virtually empty.

The 707's eventual destination was Bombay, where lessee Richard Rashid Khan Sr had to meet a contract for livestock airfreighting. The crew consisted of Khan's son (Khan Jr), a British co-pilot, and a 707-qualified flight engineer (FE). The Lulsgate incident detail recorded above is confirmed by UK Civil Aviation Authority records; the majority of the remainder comes from conversations between Flight and the Boeing's FE, who now works as an engineer with a British company.

Before proceeding with the saga, here is how the aircraft arrived at Lulsgate. It started life with Pan American in late 1963 as N723PA. Pan Am sold the 707 in 1974 to Air Union AG of Switzerland (AU), which, according to' the FE, leased the aircraft to individual operators in Nicaragua and other countries under the US registration N711UT, or marked with Swaziland or Yugoslav registration as requested. Khan Sr leased the aircraft from AU in mid-1979, and used the false Zaire registration 9Q-CRY by which the aircraft was identified in the Lulsgate accident report. The aircraft was at Helsinki when Khan acquired it, and it was flown from there to Lasham in southern England where Dan-Air Engineering was tasked with carrying out some maintenance. The FE tells Flight that the maintenance brief to Dan-Air was some 62 defects short of what was required to make the aircraft fully fit, including main gear problems.

After 26 days at Lasham the aircraft was required to move, and Khan elected to fly it to Lulsgate. The No 4 generator failed and had to be repaired before final departure for the west country. The FE reports that compasses were functioning poorly and neither HF radio worked. This was still the situation on departure for Kuwait, but during the Middle East flight a transformer-rectifier unit (TRU) failed, another was malfunctioning, and most of the engineer's instruments followed the compasses into partial or total unserviceability.

Khan reportedly has an agile stylewith official paperwork, as initially evidenced by the pilot's licences. He has apparently used Dan-Air stationery to- back up maintenance and registration, claims; insurance company letterheads to claim cover that did not exist; and called his "airline" variously Cargo Air, Air Union, Air Transco and, in Bombay only, Khan Air. Air Transco SA is the real name of a Brussels-based aircraft broker which had been involved in Khan's acquisition of the AU lease. According to the FE the Air Transco' chairman had made some small investment in Khan's venture and he was a passenger on the Luisgate departure; but a few weeks after Khan began operations Air Transco withdrew all support. Khan, however, had reportedly made unauthorized use of Transco's name, stationery, and claimed at one stage to be; the firm's operations director.

Here is the inside story of that Lulsgate take-off as told to Flight by the engineer. Four days before departure, Richard Rashid Khan Jr asked the FE to travel to Lulsgate and help him fuel the aircraft. The engineer refused, saying refueling could take place on the day of departure. Khan Jr has airline piloting experience and a revoked US commercial pilot's licence. Khan loaded 70,0001b of fuel anyway, filling the centre tank with the remainder in main tanks—the wrong order for this operation.

On departure day the FE supervised fuelling to 152,0001b, and Khan Jr told him to do the take-off calculations. The FE, becoming progressively more curious about the crew's apparent lack of expertise despite their paper qualifications, did the sums from the Pan Am manual and emerged with a take-off distance required of 7,600ft. Khan advised him the runway was 7,800ft. Actual distance is 6,600ft between the two sets of piano keys. The British copilot, whose real qualifications appear to amount to a PPL and assistant instructor's rating, took no' part in preparations.

The FE, read all the start and taxi checks and called for captain's takeoff briefing. Khan said "normal takeoff." During the final stages of taxiing, as the captain was changing the stabiliser setting, the FE asked whether this would be a rolling takeoff or a spool-up against the brakes. Khan replied by entering the runway, setting take-off power and calling the engineer to trim the throttles on the roll. The copilot gave no speed calls. Khan rotated at the far threshold and the aircraft staggered airborne; with audible relief he reported "airborne" to the tower. The aircraft hit almost all the approach lights, some hedges and trees, and rate of climb at 400ft was minimal.

A few seconds after Khan's airborne report, Bristol Tower transmitted "Sir, do you realise what you have done?" To Khan's negative, the tower replied "You have damaged the runway lights, sir. There seem to be some pieces of aircraft as well. We will report back." Some time later the tower reported finding honeycomb structure from the flaps and sundry other pieces. Khan's reaction to the information was to order the crew not to tell the Air Transco chap.

On arrival at Kuwait, Khan led the passenger rapidly away from the aircraft, leaving the engineer and copilot to study the damage. There was more than the FE had expected. He had experienced problems with the pressurisation during the flight, but this was a leaky ship anyway, and there had been no apparent aerodynamic problems. Metal bars were hanging out of the fuselage underside which had much debris embedded in it; a 3ft long metal bar protruded from a wing; the landing gear was festooned with tree branches, and the undercarriage bay doors and locks were damaged; finally, the air conditioning bay was full of metal debris.

The engineer walked round the Kuwait Airways hangars trying to get some assistance in carrying out temporary repairs. Some help to patch holes was eventually forthcoming, and after the FE had worked 10hr hours on the airframe and the TRUs Khan reappeared ready to leave for Bombay.

Despite assurances before departure from UK that there would be main maintenance facilities at Bombay, Khan Sr asserted that there were none arranged for this aircraft. Landing gear problems had become acute. Several subsequent flights out of Bombay to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were made with the left main gear down because it would not retract. Khan's replies to startled air traffic controllers who made observations on this were intended to make the ATC men believe they were "seeing things." But this happened sufficiently often that the gear problem, combined with the general appearance of the aircraft, caused the UAE authorities to take an interest in Khan's operation. Khan allegedly fended off this interest with forged papers and licences and attempted bribery.

Two methods were used to stop the crew co-operating with any interested external parties like the UAE authorities, and to keep them flying. Khan kept them poor; salary was always due tomorrow. And wherever he could get away with it he would discredit the FE by blaming him for technical problems.

Business began to dry up, and the aircraft remained on the ground at Bombay for some weeks. The FE was looking for ways of returning to the UK but had no money to buy a ticket. Early in the morning at the beginning of January, the engineer was woken by an agitated Khan Sr who told him to prepare the aircraft for departure to Sharjah. When he arrived at the airport the FE found Khan Sr surrounded by airport officials, but Khan told him to go away whenever he approached the group. The aircraft finally departed, captained this timeby Khan Sr.

The aircraft stayed at Sharjah until January 25, during which time there was considerable argument about salary due and other matters. The British co-pilot was sent home.

Two days before final departure from Sharjah the FE was told that departure was imminent and he should remain in his hotel. The destination was not mentioned, except that it was in Europe. The following day he was told to prepare the aircraft, and specifically ordered to Check all filters, oil quantity, and to supervise the refuelling. Having done this, the engineer was told in the evening that take-off would be very early next day.

At daybreak the crew and passengers grouped in the hotel lobby to take the bus to the airport. Both Khans were there, their wives, a child, a hotel employee who wanted a lift to Europe, and the engineer. Destination was to be Luxembourg. On arrival at the aircraft, the FE checked and serviced the landing gear oleos and particularly the faulty left main gear levelling cylinder—the main cause of failure to retract.

Khan Sr asked if everything was ready for departure, and when assured it was he made great play of the opportunity the FE now had to buy at the duty free shop. When the engineer did not want to go, Khan gave him $20 to buy with; the FE went. When the engineer returned, everyone was on board ready for departure. Engines were started, and Khan Sr, in the captain's seat, was warned that take-off must be complete within 15min if he wanted the left main gear to retract. Checks and taxiing were quickly finished and Khan executed a rolling take-off run.

About 2 1/2 hours into the flight the FE noticed some vibration, followed by illumination of No. 3 engine low oil light. He retarded the throttle but vibration continued to increase, and within a few seconds the engine seized. Khan looked panicky. The vibration reduced but did not stop with No. 3's involuntary shutdown. This time No. 4 was shaking, and the gauges showed it was losing oil fast. The crew elected to shut this one down before it seized. The aircraft, overhead Turkey's white-capped mountains at flight level 330 (33,000ft) when No. 3 failed, had drifted down to FL290 by the time No. 4 had to be put out. Driftdown continued to FL160, and Ankara was chosen as the diversion. Hypoxia was becoming a problem because there was no oxygen on board; engines 1 and 2 could not pressurise a leaky hull as well as keeping it flying. And No. 2 was beginning to vibrate severely. Ankara was cloud-covered, and while giving vectors for a radar approach ATC went dead for five minutes with total ground power failure. There was panic on the flightdeck because the crew did not know what had caused the sudden silence. But the controller's voice came back, and the aircraft landed with both remaining engines operating.

The FE found No. 4's 8gal oil tank almost empty. Engines 2 and 4 would turn by hand, but with difficulty; No. 3 was seized and No. 1 seemed good. On checking the oil filters the FE found far more sand and small metal pieces in them than he considered could have got there by accident. Khan says it must have come about by intake ingestion; since this is not possible, the FE wonders what happened while he was buying duty-frees at Sharjah.

The 707 is still at Ankara, and a lot of people are looking for the Khans.

Source: Flight Archives

The Boeing 707 was later scrapped at Ankara Airport.

[Tayub]

Richard Khan played an extensive con. On those days, it was very hard to verify official documents. Usually, official seals and stamps were the only way to authenticate documents. Which was easy to forge. If he could have spent all these energies productively, he could have been a licensed pilot and had a respect of his community. Now, he must be living under a forged identity and fear.
I am surprised that this incident was never discussed among the PIA crew members. Also, I never had a chance to meet anyone who was directly hired to command B707/720. It seems, everything is possible.