AirBlue jet down in Islamabad

[nopy99]

A transcript of the CVR should have been included as an appendix in the report.

At least the publishing of the report publicly is a step forward (irrespective of the contents)

[fawad]

Captain of crashed Air Blue flight ignored Air Traffic Controller: CAA

ISLAMABAD: The Captain of the fateful Air Blue flight that crashed into Margala Hills in July 2010 ignored Air Traffic Controller's suggestions, according to the CAA's findings of the investigation into the incident.

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has made public the investigation report of the Air Blue flight ABQ-202 that crashed into Margala Hills on July 28, 2010.

According to the findings, at 8:26 AM the Captain asked the First Officer (FO) to activate secondary flight plan, which was activated in the FMS.

At 8:27 AM the captain of the fateful plane completely ignoring the instructions coming from an officer at control tower told the First Officer in the cockpit 'let him say whatever he wants to say'.

The finding said: "After break-off from ILS approach, the Captain ignored the tower controller's suggestion (at 0437:54) to fly a bad weather circuit by saying 'let him say whatever he wants to say'. The CVR recording and flight simulation show that the Captain probably decided to fly a managed approach on pre-selected PBDS unbeknown to the ATS".

At 8:28 AM the FO asked the Captain 'sir, but are you visual' and captain replied in the affirmative.

At 8:30 AM when the aircraft was 3.5 NM (nautical miles) from the runway, it took a left turn 'through autopilot'.

The FO at 8:33 AM told the captain 'sir higher ground has reached, sir there is a terrain ahead, sir turn left'.

The captain at 8:34 AM had become 'very jittery in his verbal communication and displayed frustration, confusion and anxiety resulting in further deterioration in his behaviour'.

At 8:36 AM the FO told the captain 'sir terrain ahead is coming'. The captain replied 'Han ji (yes), we are turning left'. But the aircraft did not turn left.

The report said at 8:37 AM, "The pilots were unsure of their geographical position and did not seek Radar help. The consequent loss of situation awareness caused the aircraft to go astray."

Source: http://www.geo.tv/GeoDetail.aspx?ID=45972


Is that all they came up with? Didn't the court order a fresh inquiry and a new report?

[saadm80]

This Shows Poor CRM, when it comes to FD Crew Communicating, but then Capt of Airblue Crash back in PIA did similar thing, and Honestly speaking He was Arrogant at times with his FOs back in PIA days....

[zerokool]

This Shows Poor CRM, when it comes to FD Crew Communicating, but then Capt of Airblue Crash back in PIA did similar thing, and Honestly speaking He was Arrogant at times with his FOs back in PIA days....

According to CVR, the captain ignored 21 automatic warnings "Terrain Ahead" The Captains arrogance towards FO is something but what about the arrogance towards his own gadgets To me "CVR" transcript look like a suicide mission

[saadm80]

This Shows Poor CRM, when it comes to FD Crew Communicating, but then Capt of Airblue Crash back in PIA did similar thing, and Honestly speaking He was Arrogant at times with his FOs back in PIA days....

According to CVR, the captain ignored 21 automatic warnings "Terrain Ahead" The Captains arrogance towards FO is something but what about the arrogance towards his own gadgets To me "CVR" transcript look like a suicide mission

Agree, from day one my Stance was, Aircraft was Airworthy, and Accident was due to Human Factor.... Now the Question is EGPWS Was activated, why didn't the FO reacted, if the Captain was not Responding to his Calls, He should have reacted and initiated TOGA, and Climbed... reason being "Captain is always right" until this kind of attitude is not finished, you will see more Disasters like this......

[Khan747]

Informative article on www.flightglobal.com with technical information about AirBlue tragedy.

Captain's arrogance preceded Airblue A321 catastrophe

By David Kaminski-Morrow

Pakistani investigators have catalogued the arrogance and poor airmanship demonstrated by an Airblue Airbus A321 captain before the twinjet crashed into high terrain during a bungled circling approach to Islamabad.

The inquiry found that the enhanced ground-proximity warning system issued 15 'pull up' warnings, among a total of 21 alerts, but the crew failed to respond.

It also determined that the first officer had tried in vain to warn the captain of danger, but that he had been subjected to humiliation, castigation and an overbearing manner during the flight.



The aircraft had lined up for Runway 30 before breaking off for the circling approach, in low visibility, to the opposite-direction Runway 12.

But the A321 strayed north-west after the crew failed to follow the prescribed course, and the captain inadvertently turned the aircraft towards mountainous terrain while attempting to correct its heading.

Evidence of poor crew co-operation had emerged at the beginning of the flight from Karachi. During the initial climb the captain "tested the knowledge" of the first officer, using "harsh words and snobbish tone", said the Pakistan civil aviation authority.

These "intermittent humiliating session" continued over the space of an hour, sapping the first officer's confidence and rendering him "quiet" and "submissive", with the result that he did not challenge the captain's subsequent violations of procedure during the flight.

The captain had a "strong fixation" for a right-hand downwind circling approach, said the Pakistani accident report, and air traffic control twice had to refuse his request for such a manoeuvre, as it was not permitted. The CAA also pointed out that the successful touchdown by a Pakistan International Airlines flight - albeit at the third attempt - probably put the captain under "further pressure" to land the Airblue jet.

After breaking off to execute the left-hand circle, the captain then took the aircraft down to 2,300ft, below the minimum descent altitude of 2,510ft. The first officer - who had logged fewer than 1,900h, against nearly 25,500h for the captain - did not challenge the breach.

The circling procedure required the jet, after the break-off, to turn left in order to track downwind parallel to the runway - displaced no more than 1.3nm from the centreline.

But the captain, in another breach of procedures, had instructed the first officer to insert four additional, unauthorised waypoints into the flight management system, effectively creating a new flightpath for the approach.

"The [cockpit] recording and flight simulation show that the captain probably decided to fly a managed approach on pre-selected [unauthorised waypoints] unbeknown to [air traffic control]," said the Pakistani CAA.

Against procedures the captain failed to maintain visual contact with the airport. The aircraft continued to fly north-west, heading for high terrain and an area of restricted airspace. This caused the terrain-warning system to begin issuing cautionary alerts, and prompted air traffic control to instruct the A321 to turn left. The first officer also verbally informed the captain of the terrain risk.

But while the captain kept dialling in a reduced heading, the aircraft did not respond because he had opted to fly the approach using the A321's 'NAV' mode.

"The pilots were unsure of their geographical position and did not seek radar help," said the CAA. "The consequent loss of situational awareness caused the aircraft to go astray."

Forty seconds before the accident the correct mode for a heading change was engaged. But by this time the requested heading had been dialled down to 086°, and the aircraft naturally took the shortest approach to this new heading - turning right instead of left, taking the twinjet towards the Margalla hills.

Despite the ground-proximity warning system sounding 'pull up' warnings, and the first officer urging the same, the captain failed to respond, instead executing extreme manoeuvres - including banking 52° - and expressing his inability to understand why the aircraft was not turning as instructed.

"The aircraft had ended up in a dangerous situation because of [the] most unprofessional handling by the captain," said the CAA. "Since the desired initiative of [the first officer] had been curbed and a communication barrier had already been created by the captain, the first officer failed to intervene, take over the controls to pull the aircraft out of danger and display required [crew resource management] skills."

None of the 146 passengers and six crew members survived when the aircraft hit the Margalla hills, some 7.3nm north of the Runway 12 threshold.

In its conclusions over the 28 July 2010 accident the CAA said the crew "failed to display superior judgement and professional skills", and added: "In their pursuit to land in inclement weather they committed serious violations of procedures and breaches of flying discipline, which put the aircraft in an unsafe condition over dangerous terrain at low altitude."

Source: www.flightglobal.com

Abbas

I am not familiar with flying but based on path took by AB aircraft, was it because captain saw lot of activities (thunder clouds on weather radar) in route of circling approach of runway 12 & he diverted further right then normal approach & then totally distracted.

[saadm80]

first of all, i am "Against Circle to Land Procedures" has caused soo many accidents that Some Airlines have stopped their FD Crew from Performing this Procedure...

2) Captain Ignored EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System), looks like Captain mental condition was not up to the mark, and He got soo confused and seems like he was under pressure, for this precise issue FO is there.... He should have taken over the controls, after all Captain was a Safety Hazard to the Aircraft and the Passengers...

[jameel.ashraf3]

Interesting, Well In my Opinion Its not only Pilot its ATC as well...

For all who Fly Civil and also All who are from Airforce must be familiar with The Terms/Instructions given by ATC, they have slight difference,

Like in ABove Post by Fawad, interesting Point,
"The finding said: "After break-off from ILS approach, the Captain ignored the tower controller's suggestion (at 0437:54) to fly a bad weather circuit by saying 'let him say whatever he wants to say'. The CVR recording and flight simulation show that the Captain probably decided to fly a managed approach on pre-selected PBDS unbeknown to the ATS". "

How many of you are Familiar with it in Civil and In Airforce... There is No Such Term of BAD WEATHER CIRCUIT in Jeppessen as per my Knowledge or in Civil they are used in Airforce commonly.

Secondly, ATC if many of you are aware is Airforce at OPRN, its not under Civil Control and hence Airforce Procedures are being followed.
A Visual approach Tracking requirements for a visual approach in CIVIL include the following:
a. A pilot in command must maintain track/heading on the route progressively authorised by " ATC " until:
(1) by day, within 5NM of the aerodrome; or by
(2) night,
- for an IFR flight, within the prescribed circling area; or
- for a VFR flight, within 3NM of the aerodrome; and the aerodrome is in sight.
b. From this position the circuit must be joined as directed by ATC for an approach to the nominated runway.

Also for ATCO's its requirement to stay visual to the aircraft too, if they are not then they'll have to put a restriction like you may have heard " "cleared for visual approach runway 30, maintain 800 feet until established on final " in foreign CAR's i've read also Minimum Altitude Requirements. During the conduct of a visual approach, a pilot must descend as necessary to:
a. by day:
(1) for an IFR flight, remain not less than 500FT above the lower limit of the CTA; and
(2) for IFR and VFR flights, operate not below the lowest altitude permissible for VFR flight

In my opinion in Consider ATC to have the same share with Captain.

Important Point, as per Pakistan ANO's and air traffic controller must be in possession of a Valid Licence but unfortunately at OPRN you have Airforce guys controlling the Field so Airforce Rules and Procedures apply. This is the Conflict between CAA Pakistan and Pakistan Airforce. If they both Limit themselves to their own role its good, fair, but airforce has taken over Civil Flying too but have not adopted Civil or Transport rules.

Captains Errors are there as per Report... Could have saved. As i always Heard A person sitting in Air conditioned Office doesn't know the State of a Person flying the Aircraft. At the end of the Day Person in Cockpit is responsible.
First Officer was New and hence was hesitated, Remember in Airbus there is no Captain or FirstOfficer its CM1 and CM2 they both are Equally qualified. they Bother respect and response each other straight away then building an Ego.

Note... This is my opinion No Body needs to Agree, its Social Forum so i've written my thoughts.

Regards,

[saadm80]

CM1 is the occupant of the LHS. CM2 is the occupant of the RHS

[Abbas Ali]

According to local news channels, today Peshawar High Court (PHC) ordered AirBlue to complete distribution of compensation money to relatives of flight ED-202 crash victims within next 20 days.

The airline's flight operations will be suspended if it fails to follow court order.

Abbas

[jameel.ashraf3]

Dear Abbas,

Court Announced,
1. Global release document declared null and void by the Court.
2. AirBlue to be grounded on day 21 if not paid to all families.
3. Succession certificate condition relaxed. Payment to be made against bonds.
4. All responsibility now on AirBlue to make payment arrangements.
5. Court ordered them to go from house to house of affected families with cheques.
6. Defense Minister given an “Option” to resign.

1- In my Opinion it can't be Declared Null lets see detailed Judgment why its been Declared Null.
2- Airblue has already compensated 115 Victims or more.
3- Rest of Them have Issues of " Succession certificate " and Some have Problems who is going to Get the Compensation i.e; Father, Wife etc.
4- Airblue has all the payments arranged.
5- Airblue has already conducted and contacted House to House of Victims but again as point 3, there are issues.
6- DG CAA has been suspended in some Geo Reports.

[Abbas Ali]

^ Thank you Jameel for the info.

Btw, on AirBlue flights schedule (http://airblue.com/Sched/View.asp) I noticed the airline has retired flight number ED-202.

Abbas

[jameel.ashraf3]

Welcome Abbas, ED202 is retired since the day of Crash.. Airblue operate 200-201, 204-205 only...

[smhusain_1]

What more do you want? The aircraft crashed.

Captain of crashed Air Blue flight ignored Air Traffic Controller: CAA

ISLAMABAD: The Captain of the fateful Air Blue flight that crashed into Margala Hills in July 2010 ignored Air Traffic Controller's suggestions, according to the CAA's findings of the investigation into the incident.

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has made public the investigation report of the Air Blue flight ABQ-202 that crashed into Margala Hills on July 28, 2010.

According to the findings, at 8:26 AM the Captain asked the First Officer (FO) to activate secondary flight plan, which was activated in the FMS.

At 8:27 AM the captain of the fateful plane completely ignoring the instructions coming from an officer at control tower told the First Officer in the cockpit 'let him say whatever he wants to say'.

The finding said: "After break-off from ILS approach, the Captain ignored the tower controller's suggestion (at 0437:54) to fly a bad weather circuit by saying 'let him say whatever he wants to say'. The CVR recording and flight simulation show that the Captain probably decided to fly a managed approach on pre-selected PBDS unbeknown to the ATS".

At 8:28 AM the FO asked the Captain 'sir, but are you visual' and captain replied in the affirmative.

At 8:30 AM when the aircraft was 3.5 NM (nautical miles) from the runway, it took a left turn 'through autopilot'.

The FO at 8:33 AM told the captain 'sir higher ground has reached, sir there is a terrain ahead, sir turn left'.

The captain at 8:34 AM had become 'very jittery in his verbal communication and displayed frustration, confusion and anxiety resulting in further deterioration in his behaviour'.

At 8:36 AM the FO told the captain 'sir terrain ahead is coming'. The captain replied 'Han ji (yes), we are turning left'. But the aircraft did not turn left.

The report said at 8:37 AM, "The pilots were unsure of their geographical position and did not seek Radar help. The consequent loss of situation awareness caused the aircraft to go astray."

Source: http://www.geo.tv/GeoDetail.aspx?ID=45972


Is that all they came up with? Didn't the court order a fresh inquiry and a new report?

[smhusain_1]

A circling approach is flown visually at an altitude of 800 feet AGL by keeping the runway threshold (12 here) in sight all the time during the procedure, not on any coordinates in the FMS. One cannot stray very far either during the procedure, maximum 1 to 1 and 1/2 miles from the runway centre. It is not flown on the autopilot for considerable manoeuvring may be required. Should the runway environment be lost, the pilot has to execute a missed approach towards the centre of the runway immediately always.The runway was lost because he came down to 600 feet AGL. In case there is an EGPWS alert, a go around is mandatory immediately. How many alerts do you want? How many cautions and alerts from the copilot?

Are you suggesting the mishap occurred because the ATC controller used the words, "bad weather circuit" instead of a circling approach? There is no such thing as a managed approach in the scenario here at 800 feet above the ground.

The captain's mind is not there since the aircraft did not respond to his heading inputs. His fixation to fly a right hand circuit knowing this is never permitted also is a strong indicator so early about a tired individual or a stressed one. The captain masked his uneasiness about the weather and the equipment by bull shitting the copilot.

Interesting, Well In my Opinion Its not only Pilot its ATC as well...

For all who Fly Civil and also All who are from Airforce must be familiar with The Terms/Instructions given by ATC, they have slight difference,

Like in ABove Post by Fawad, interesting Point,
"The finding said: "After break-off from ILS approach, the Captain ignored the tower controller's suggestion (at 0437:54) to fly a bad weather circuit by saying 'let him say whatever he wants to say'. The CVR recording and flight simulation show that the Captain probably decided to fly a managed approach on pre-selected PBDS unbeknown to the ATS". "

How many of you are Familiar with it in Civil and In Airforce... There is No Such Term of BAD WEATHER CIRCUIT in Jeppessen as per my Knowledge or in Civil they are used in Airforce commonly.

Secondly, ATC if many of you are aware is Airforce at OPRN, its not under Civil Control and hence Airforce Procedures are being followed.
A Visual approach Tracking requirements for a visual approach in CIVIL include the following:
a. A pilot in command must maintain track/heading on the route progressively authorised by " ATC " until:
(1) by day, within 5NM of the aerodrome; or by
(2) night,
- for an IFR flight, within the prescribed circling area; or
- for a VFR flight, within 3NM of the aerodrome; and the aerodrome is in sight.
b. From this position the circuit must be joined as directed by ATC for an approach to the nominated runway.

Also for ATCO's its requirement to stay visual to the aircraft too, if they are not then they'll have to put a restriction like you may have heard " "cleared for visual approach runway 30, maintain 800 feet until established on final " in foreign CAR's i've read also Minimum Altitude Requirements. During the conduct of a visual approach, a pilot must descend as necessary to:
a. by day:
(1) for an IFR flight, remain not less than 500FT above the lower limit of the CTA; and
(2) for IFR and VFR flights, operate not below the lowest altitude permissible for VFR flight

In my opinion in Consider ATC to have the same share with Captain.

Important Point, as per Pakistan ANO's and air traffic controller must be in possession of a Valid Licence but unfortunately at OPRN you have Airforce guys controlling the Field so Airforce Rules and Procedures apply. This is the Conflict between CAA Pakistan and Pakistan Airforce. If they both Limit themselves to their own role its good, fair, but airforce has taken over Civil Flying too but have not adopted Civil or Transport rules.

Captains Errors are there as per Report... Could have saved. As i always Heard A person sitting in Air conditioned Office doesn't know the State of a Person flying the Aircraft. At the end of the Day Person in Cockpit is responsible.
First Officer was New and hence was hesitated, Remember in Airbus there is no Captain or FirstOfficer its CM1 and CM2 they both are Equally qualified. they Bother respect and response each other straight away then building an Ego.

Note... This is my opinion No Body needs to Agree, its Social Forum so i've written my thoughts.

Regards,